velopmentalism, notably with a more complex conception of time (pp. 312–13).

The author pitches his work at sociologists, historians, and other social scientists. Sociologists will doubtless take heed of its call for more attention to childhood in the understanding of “personhood” as a totality, in place of the almost exclusive concentration on adulthood in their work. Sociologists of childhood in particular will accept the proposal for more historical depth to their discipline to help them understand our present conceptualization of childhood—though it must be said that leading lights in the field such as Chris Jenks, Alan Prout, and Allison James have by no means neglected ideas from the past. As for historians, including this reviewer, they may well ponder the theoretical rigor of this sociological approach and the links it establishes between the present and the past. Turmel has read widely in the great canon of literature produced by developmental psychologists and has also drawn extensively from the work of sociologists and historians. He does well to make us aware of our reliance on developmental thinking on childhood, noting its advantages as well as disadvantages for child welfare. It must be said that for all the attention paid to the so-called “new paradigm” in childhood studies, this study does little to depict children as social actors in their own right, given its focus on adult luminaries such as G. Stanley Hall, Alfred Binet, Arnold Gesell, and Jean Piaget. One might also quibble over a tendency to repetition (following from the laudable aim of summing up each chapter and linking sections clearly), and the tendency to bury important points in the footnotes. Nonetheless, Turmel’s book stands as an innovative work that one hopes will stimulate further studies in its field.


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*Just One Child* is an impressively researched book by one of the most innovative analysts of contemporary demography and population policy. Susan Greenhalgh spent over a decade as a policy analyst at the U.S. Population Council before joining the anthropology department at University of California at Irvine. Her role as an insider-critic with a longstanding interest in Chinese population policy is clearly evident in this book.

Greenhalgh takes on China’s one-child policy, one of the most difficult political and scientific issues in either population policy or Chinese politics. Rather than focusing on the dismal consequences of that policy, which Greenhalgh and others have documented elsewhere (e.g., Susan Green-
halgh, “Controlling Births and Bodies in Village China,” *American Ethnologist*, 21 [1994]: 3–30, and Wong Siu-lun, “Consequences of China’s New Population Policy,” *The China Quarterly*, 98 [1984]: 220–40), this work focuses on the more temporally narrow, but important and often overlooked, question of the origin of the policy itself. While Greenhalgh peppers her text with normative statements about the devastation wrought by this policy, her focus is on the three short years, between 1978 and 1980, in which Chinese political leaders developed an increasingly restrictive set of birth policies that culminated in the one-child-for-all policy.

This outcome, Greenhalgh argues, defies simple scientific or political explanation. She thus works against two dominant perspectives: (1) the realist argument that China was compelled by the reality of rapid population growth to take drastic measures (the official Chinese government line); and (2) the political argument that the one-child approach was an ideological formulation of internal party politics, and that science was either irrelevant or consciously constructed to provide justification for a predetermined policy. Instead, Greenhalgh tells a complex and contingent story in which competing scientific positions help shape the political and conceptual formulation of the one-child policy. Central to her story, in fact, are struggles over what counts as population science, who are legitimate representatives of that science, and how population dynamics should be conceptualized. Neither predetermined in a way that drove policy nor simply answered in a way to support preexisting policy schemes, Greenhalgh shows that these questions were instead answered through the coproduction of scientific knowledge and political order (Sheila Jas-anoff, ed., *States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order* [Routledge, 2004]).

The book itself is broken into two main sections, following an introduction and historical contextualization. The first section focuses on the constitution of population science in the early Deng era, with an emphasis on competition among three approaches—Chinese Marxian statistics, cybernetic modeling and control theory, and Chinese Marxian humanism. This clash between three different scientific formulations of the population problem is also, she argues, a struggle over the relationship between science and the emerging post-Maoist state. The second section looks at the role of both scientists and more traditional political actors in increasingly articulating and accepting crisis-oriented conceptualizations of population dynamics and the necessity of a forceful, top-down population policy. The first section is highly original in its interpretation of the place of science in the history of Chinese population policy. The second is impressive for Greenhalgh’s ability to get behind the official story of the policy’s final stages of development. I will focus primarily on the first.

The story of the three competing approaches is presented as a series of credibility struggles in which the cyberneticists successfully cast themselves as the real scientists, taking on the mantle of truth, accuracy, mo-
dernity, and universality. Developing a purely mathematical model of the population problem inspired by the Club of Rome’s complex, and highly criticized, systems modeling practices, the cyberneticists developed a powerful set of inscriptions—graphs and tables—showing that China faced an imminent environmental crisis requiring drastic measures. This image increasingly became the dominant frame for China’s leaders. In Greenhalgh’s telling, the facts did not just speak for themselves, but rather a social and political process authorized a set of scientific truths and a true science to speak for them. The crisis frame provided by the cyberneticists did not push the political and social costs of the one-child-for-all policy completely off the table, but rather, established the need for “a solution when there is no solution” (p. 272), a drastic necessity amid a frame that maximized demographic dangers and minimized social, personal, and political costs. “Scientization had produced a profound dehumanization of population thought” (p. 287).

China’s one-child policy has long been viewed by critics as the culmination of unchecked neo-Malthusianism. While disrupting many assumptions, this book seems to support that view. The problem, Greenhalgh suggests, is not the use of population modeling and projection in policymaking, but rather the emergence of an environment in which abstract, mathematical models were allowed to go unchecked and unexamined even as similar models were being dismantled in the West, and in which crisis-oriented scientism was allowed to dominate over social and cultural analyses of population dynamics. In the West, the neo-Malthusian orientation was also strong during this time, but it was balanced by a range of critics, both scientific and social. The Chinese critics were weak and had poor access to authoritative knowledge of their own, and political criticism was highly constrained once the scientific frame was in place.

Thus a strong political message shines through: the full acceptance by Chinese leaders of a technocratic framing of the population problem led to the excesses and abuses of the strict one-child policy. Greenhalgh clearly advocates an approach to policy that is built upon demography—but demography as an interdisciplinary social science with strong humanistic sensibilities and practices. This is a position that she has directly advocated in the past with her attempts to expand anthropological demography. Greenhalgh is an interdisciplinary scholar who mixes the quantitative and qualitative and the humanistic and scientific in her own work, and shows us firsthand the dangers of straying too far toward the poles of scientism and technocracy.

The book is written in a highly accessible and conversational style. While long and quite detailed in places, it would be appropriate for advanced undergraduates and graduate students in courses on Chinese politics, science studies, demography, or policy studies. As a highly interdisciplinary work, it would be appreciated by a wide range of scholars.