

Introduction: Population as Politics

THE LAST FEW CENTURIES have seen a growing preoccupation with human life—individuals and populations as biological entities—among governing authorities and mass publics everywhere in the world. The administration of collective human life, health, and welfare has become a key objective of modern states. Some projects have been life-enhancing, such as the global extension of public health measures and incipient efforts to manage relationships between population, environment, and resources. Others have been life-threatening, such as racist cleansing of ethnic populations and socialist collectivization of peasantries. In the early twenty-first century the world seems to be entering a new phase of vital politics in which rationalized interventions in human life are taking new forms and gaining added significance. The proliferation of new biosciences and biotechnologies, the emergence of novel forms of biological citizenship and biocapital, and bioethical controversies over interventions at the beginning and end of life, and, indeed, what counts as life and death, all exemplify the growing importance of the biological in political life.

The case of population management in the People's Republic of China merits particular attention—and not only because of the gargantuan size of the PRC's population, now over 1.3 billion. China is important also because the PRC's interventions in human life are so broad and deep, and because the shifts in its population politics are so big, so weighty—and so little understood. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, population has become a central object of power in China. Concern about governing population processes originated in the PRC regime but soon spread throughout Chinese society. Those concerns focused initially on the location of the population (keeping rural people out of cities), but gradually grew to embrace its quantity (slowing growth and limiting size) and its "quality" (enhancing not only

health and education but also social morality and political commitment). Meanwhile, the PRC's intervention in reproduction became an object of international consternation and a contentious issue in the PRC's relations with the rest of the world. Over the last half century population has become an ever-expanding domain of Chinese politics.

Preoccupation with Population

All of the PRC's main leaders have regarded the size and "backwardness" of China's population as the fundamental point of departure for development strategy. Under Mao Zedong, a large but "poor and blank" population appeared sometimes an asset and sometimes a liability. Regime intervention remained tentative and intermittent, but the goal of slowing population growth gradually rose on the political agenda. Under Deng Xiaoping, the large size and low quality of China's population loomed unequivocally as a serious obstacle to China's modernization. Post-Mao leaders gave limiting reproduction a central and urgent place in China's new program of national reform and global ascent. Under Jiang Zemin, policy first persevered at limiting population quantity and then, on the premise of maintaining low fertility, shifted toward raising population quality. By the Hu Jintao era of the early 2000s, the PRC is using its newly redefined population-and-reproduction policy domain to address long-neglected social problems of gender imbalance, old-age security, and rural-urban distribution, problems that strict birth limits had greatly aggravated. In partial recompense, in the Hu era "population policy" has come close to meaning "social policy." Limiting the number, raising the quality, and optimizing the location of China's population have become central objects of Chinese statecraft.

During these same decades, population at the aggregate level and reproduction at the individual level have also become major concerns of Chinese society. Ordinary Chinese have long viewed their country as a place of vast territory and abundant people (*difang da, renkou duo*). Under the PRC, these understandings have taken on fresh meanings and significances. As the PRC began first to modernize and then to globalize, enmeshing both regime and society in transnational processes, China's people have become increasingly preoccupied with producing world-class persons: good scientific mothers, exemplary single children, and globally competitive workers. Animating these new concerns has been a dizzying array of developments around "population." The years since Mao's death have brought the proliferation of demographic discourses, the multiplication of population institutions, the commodification of childrearing, and the intensification of interventions designed to "govern" population by an ever-expanding range of actors, from state bureaucracies to professional institutions, capitalist corporations, and the

public at large. Over time, couples have come to limit their childbearing ever more stringently and invest in childrearing ever more heavily. Since the 1990s, political tensions between regime and society have eased, as popular fertility culture has begun to converge with state birth propaganda and state programs have begun to respond to emerging popular demands for better and better-delivered reproductive health care.

During these same decades, China has experienced one of the fastest fertility declines in recorded history. During the 1970s, the number of children per woman dropped from just under 6 to just under 3. In the 1980s, fertility hovered somewhat above the “replacement level” of about 2.1 children per woman. By the 2000s, according to the best recent studies, fertility appears to have fallen further to around 1.6. In the last quarter century, individual and societal reproduction has been “modernized” and China has achieved much of the “great power” population structure to which it has long aspired. Internationally, the PRC has been both acclaimed for its responsible slowing of population growth and denounced for its repression of reproductive rights. Despite these apparent certainties, the relationship between state population policy and social-demographic change remains unclear. Given the close connections between a locality’s program strength and socioeconomic development, it is impossible to estimate with any precision the relative contributions to fertility decline of program and development. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests perhaps an equal influence in the 1970s and 1980s and a decline in the program’s influence in the 1990s and 2000s. Within the birth program’s contribution, it is even more difficult to distinguish between the impact of the conventional components—educating the public, providing contraceptives—and the coercive components that distinguished the PRC’s approach to slowing population growth from those of other developing countries. As discussed in the Conclusion, these uncertainties greatly complicate assessments of the program’s contribution to China’s spectacular economic and social development of recent decades.

Governmentalization of Population

Western scholarship has reported much about the demographic change accompanying the PRC’s rapid development and institutionalization of population policy, but little about the political dynamics animating it or about the place of population in the regime’s larger agendas of rebuilding the economy and securing its own power. Equally obscure are the political effects of this buildup of governmental thought and institutions around population on the PRC regime, on the Chinese people, and on China’s place in the world. Consideration of these political effects poses the still broader yet unasked question of the nature and transformations of the power brought to bear on

population within this rising actor on the world stage. For several reasons—including a division of labor between scholarly disciplines that assigns population to demography and a division of opinion that makes Chinese population policy controversial both in China and abroad—population remains a relatively uncharted domain of state policy and political life in China.

This book argues that the PRC's population project has become central to post-Mao politics and power in ways that have not been appreciated. A productive perspective for connecting population to power centers on the notion of "governmentalization." This perspective was first developed by the French philosopher and social critic Michel Foucault as a way to extend the notion of governance beyond solely state-centered processes (1991, 102–103). The governmentality approach has since been developed by others and applied to a variety of areas, including statistics and the social, insurance and risk, health and medicine, crime and penology (e.g., Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982; Rose 1999, Dean 1999; Ong and Collier 2005). This book applies these constructs to population, as Foucault himself started to do.

We argue that the PRC's population project has been a striking case of governmentalization, in the extended sense delineated by Foucault. His schema involves three sets of dynamics. First, governmentalization of population includes intervention by "government" in the conventional sense. Early modern states attempted to manage social processes quite directly, and communism continued that tradition in the Soviet Union and China. This is the first, overwhelmingly Leninist, half of the story of PRC birth planning, which by the Deng era applied Soviet techniques for the state planning of economic growth to the state planning of population growth. However, governmentalization also includes two other dynamics: the disciplining of conduct by nonstate social institutions and the cultivation by individuals themselves of the capacity to regulate their own behavior. Later modern states found it impossible to manage on their own the vast range of problems and processes that population involved. A more economical strategy for the state was to retreat to the role of orchestrating interventions by a variety of forces, including by the state itself, but only when absolutely necessary. That was the core of nineteenth-century liberalism, and it is the core of the neoliberalism that, by the turn of the millennium, had become the globally dominant paradigm for effective governance. This is the second, increasingly neoliberal, half of the story of PRC birth planning. During the Jiang era the program began facing up to the appalling "side costs" (*daijia*) of enforcing strict birth limits and began reforming PRC birth planning in an increasingly neoliberal direction. (These terms are defined later in this chapter.)

In this book, governmentalization serves not only as the central construct guiding our analysis but also as the master historical process informing our

narrative of the Chinese population case. The governmentalization analytic helps illuminate the trajectory of the past, the nature of the present, and even the options for the future. Foucault's method was to first identify important features of the present, and then mine the past to discover how they developed. The result was a "history of the present." This book is also concerned to diagnose the prospects for the future, viewed from the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century ("the early 2000s"). The book charts the trajectory of the PRC's antinatalist population project since its origins in the mid-1950s. The only slow rise of "soft" birth control during the Mao era precipitated the very rapid rise of "hard" birth planning during the Deng era, which in turn provoked the gradually deepening reforms of the Jiang era. This policy evolution defined the problems and opportunities left to the Hu era. We dig into the historical record to identify the enduring features of population politics, tracing how they arose, how they took shape, and how they have been transformed. Happily, many of these developments point the way to a future that will be notably different from the past. In particular, the reforms in the birth program that PRC leaders launched between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s are very promising but remain little reported.

We view governmentalization through two sets of lenses, one analytical, the other practical. The analytical lenses are the authors' own complementary disciplinary approaches, which we tag as "regime capacity" and "biopower." The practical lenses are the alternative approaches to governance that PRC leaders themselves have adopted, which we tag most broadly as Maoism, Stalinism, and Reformism. We briefly introduce these lenses in this chapter and then elaborate them in the next (the *Problematic*).

Regime Capacity and Biopower: An Experiment in Interdisciplinarity

This book's analytical approaches to studying governmentalization pair the perspective of a political scientist viewing policymaking within the state, with the perspective of an anthropologist witnessing the consequences emerging within society. Our subject—the governance of population in a country of more than one billion people in the midst of a momentous transition from socialism—is one of those domains of modern life that is so big, so complex, and so protean that no single approach can do it justice. The social facts we seek to illuminate demand new methods and new approaches that stretch across conventional disciplinary, methodological, and theoretical divides. Today, interdisciplinary work in the social sciences usually joins fields whose intellectual premises are quite similar. Political science's bor-

rowings from economics and the convergence of anthropology and history are prime examples. In this study we develop a new type of interdisciplinarity. We offer this not as a finished product but as a methodological and theoretical experiment that we hope others working on similarly complex modern issues, in China and elsewhere, might find stimulating. One disciplinary approach employed is the historical and rational institutionalism of political science, summarized through “regime capacity.” The other disciplinary approach is the broadly Foucauldian social constructivism of anthropology and women’s studies, summarized through “biopower.” These are quite different approaches to modern power and politics and many might regard them as incompatible. They do contrast—not only rationalist versus constructivist but also state-centric versus sociocentric and empirical-explanatory versus discursive-critical. Yet remarkably, these two approaches converge on finding the same development—governmentalization—intriguing and important.

The problematique of *regime capacity* emerges from the political science literature on state capacity (e.g., Jackman 1993, later developments summarized and critiqued by Fukuyama 2004). In this book, “regime” signals the multipillared nature of the PRC state—not only the government but also party and military—and its intrusive extension into society. The regime capacity approach focuses on how the PRC regime came to grips with a new domain of governance, framed the problem in relation to other problems, and created institutions to solve the problem. The problematique of *biopower* emerges from the investigation Foucault sketched out of how, historically in the West, “population” arose as a central domain of modern power, creating a new *biopolitics* around the administration and optimization of the processes of life. The resulting biopower entailed the increased ordering of human life itself in the name of improving the life, health, and welfare of the individual and population (Foucault 1978). This approach directs attention to the PRC’s biopolitical achievement—the emergence in a few short decades of a large edifice of discursive, bureaucratic, legal, and other forms of power around the issue of population, and the resultant increased organization of human life. These approaches differ in their evaluation of the emergence of modern population governance. The regime capacity approach, which was developed mainly to remedy “state failure” in Africa and elsewhere, accepts the elaboration of modern techniques of governance as essential to the running of complex societies. The biopower perspective, which was developed mainly as a critique of liberal governance, takes a critical stance toward the consequences of modern power, seeing the effects not as necessarily and categorically pernicious, but as ambiguous, problematic, and in various ways dangerous.

Despite their dissimilarities, these two approaches do converge in some

important respects. The point of departure for both is an insistence on not taking for granted the existence of the elements of governance, whether institutions and policies or discourses and practices. Instead, both approaches seek to account for these elements, either by explaining them in rational-strategic terms or by tracing their emergence in cultural-historical terms. Also, the two approaches highlight many of the same analytical elements, such as monitoring/surveillance and sanctions/punishment, and their patterning into distinctive institutions for regulation/discipline. Elements of the two approaches can also be combined in the analysis of specific issues. For example, in this book, the positing of policy “tendencies” (explained in Chapter 2) draws both on social-scientific repertoires of social “mechanisms” and on discursive-critical attention to the language in which policy is conceived. To the extent that the political science approach in this book is an example of historical institutionalism, it is also sociocultural and macrohistorical, like the discursive-critical approaches of anthropology. For its part, the critical approach features some “rational actors,” particularly Chinese families who, following the logics of the peasant family economy and the market, make hard-edged calculations concerning the birth and disposal of different children. The two approaches thus align rather well, complementing and enriching one another. When used together, they speak across what are usually wide disciplinary divides and expand the terrain of the political in new and, we think, provocative ways.

Bringing these two analytic approaches together offers important advantages. Because each illuminates different parts of a sprawling and complex political reality, using them together enables us to see more of Chinese population politics, and from more angles, than has been possible before. The result is an account much more inclusive than anything now available. This broadened perspective also allows us to use the case of population and reproductive politics to probe some central questions in the study of contemporary China and of communism and modernity more generally. We outline these issues at the end of this chapter and elaborate them in the book’s Conclusion.

Alternatives within Chinese Leninism: Maoism, Stalinism, and Reformism

The practical approaches to governing population are what we call alternative versions of the Leninist project in China. In the course of its rule, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has drawn on several different approaches to governance that it has applied to most policy domains, including birth planning (Solinger ed. 1984). As used here, “approaches” refers mainly not to the goals

pursued but to the methods employed—to the kinds of “policy instruments” or “institutional capacity” that a regime selects, builds, and uses. In these terms, the CCP’s approach has always been Leninist in the broad sense of relying on strong leadership by an organized party which claims that its “scientific” ideology “democratically” represents the most progressive forces in society and shows in what direction the country should go. However, the CCP has experimented with a spectrum of variants within Leninism, ranging from left through center to right. On the left is the CCP’s own largely indigenous approach, commonly referred to in China studies as Maoism. This was a lean-and-mean “revolutionary” Leninism for guerilla warfare before 1949, coordinating dispersed forces through ideological agreement and a minimum of bureaucracy. In the center is the approach that, after 1949, the CCP borrowed from the Soviet Union, commonly referred to in Soviet studies as Stalinism. The aspect of Stalinism emphasized in this book is its rather ponderous “developmental” Leninism, coordinating a centrally planned socialist construction through an elaborate technocratic bureaucracy. On the right is what post-Mao leaders themselves have referred to as Reformism—an “adaptive” Leninism that attempts to correct problems in both Maoism and Stalinism by borrowing from “advanced Western experience” so that China might become internationally competitive, both economically and militarily.

In these very broad terms, during the Mao era (roughly the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s), the CCP’s basic approach to all policy domains was mainly a varying combination of Stalinism and Maoism, but the CCP applied that approach to birth control only tentatively and intermittently (Chapter 3). During the Deng era (roughly the late 1970s through the early 1990s), the CCP finally got around to applying this approach to birth planning (Chapter 4). Meanwhile the Deng era’s approach to most other policy domains became Reformism. However, senior Deng era leaders did not allow much Reform of Stalinist-Maoist birth planning, which after all was still under construction at that time. Thus the Deng era represented the height of *Leninist* biopolitics—a politics of the administration of life by predominantly bureaucratic and mobilizational means. It was only in the Jiang era (roughly 1993–2003) that CCP leaders gradually began a progressively deepening Reform of birth planning (Chapter 5). Until about 2000 that Reform consisted mostly of getting rid of the outmoded part of the Maoist legacy (periodic crash campaigns) and completing the construction of the Stalinist approach (continuous professional work). Meanwhile, in most other policy domains, the Jiang era had gradually discarded some outmoded parts of the Stalinist legacy, in particular transferring the coordination of most economic activity from central planning to market mechanisms. Jiang era leaders were adamant that management of population growth must remain a government function. However, from

around 2000 they did begin changing the form of government management from directly planning couples' reproduction to indirectly regulating it through law. The Hu era (2003–) has continued that basic approach, though with some very significant modifications in terms of both method (less coercion, more rewards) and objective (more social policies to guarantee people's economic security).

This book argues that the Hu era has continued to shift the PRC's basic approach toward neoliberalism, which is now the globally dominant approach to governance (Chapter 6). Neoliberalism recognizes the need for government to regulate social activities. However, it requires that intervention be grounded in full understanding of the complexity and autonomy of subsystems of society, such as the economy or population. Intervention should then be as limited and indirect as possible, in the mode of central banks adjusting interest rates to regulate complex economies. The analogy in PRC birth planning would be reducing regime intervention to mild disincentives and strong incentives for complying with birth limits, which the Hu era has set out to do. A neoliberal regime works strenuously to transfer as many responsibilities as possible to communities, families, and individuals. It does so in part by constructing "neoliberal subjects" capable of governing themselves in ways deemed appropriate by the regime. Instead of underwriting extensive entitlements to government welfare payments, as socialism would do, neoliberalism regulates insurance schemes through which supposedly autonomous social actors can provide for themselves. In the Hu era, PRC social policy—including population policy—combines socialist and neoliberal approaches. Thus the Hu era has brought about a profound if partial shift from Leninist to *neoliberal* biopolitics—a politics of the administration of life by increasingly market-oriented means. The current question is: How far can the CCP carry the neoliberal approach, both in general and in population policy in particular? How far will political and practical limits allow the PRC to develop a "neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics"? Can the CCP develop a neoliberal approach within a spectrum of Leninist possibilities, extending the spectrum still further to the right? Or will the PRC adopt enough neoliberalism to carry China's transition from communism beyond Leninism to something else? It is too early to answer these questions, but it is high time to use dramatic developments in PRC population policy to explore them.

Diverse Sources

This book culminates many years of research and engagement with China's population affairs on the part of both authors, but particularly Greenhalgh.

The study is a product of a series of unique research opportunities spanning twenty years. Between 1984 and 1994 Greenhalgh served as analyst of China's population policy for the New York-based Population Council, a leading international scientific organization in the population field. The personal contacts formed during that decade have given the authors exceptional access to many of the central players in China's population policy establishment. In 1993 both authors were asked to participate in a high-level United Nations mission to China to explore charges of coercion in the birth program. During 1998–2002, both authors were invited to lecture in an Advanced Leadership Program that brought six groups of two dozen top Chinese birth program officials to the United States to learn of new thinking in the international population community. The actors we interviewed, and in some cases ethnographically observed, include individuals situated at virtually every key node in China's birth project below the national political leadership: top policymakers at the national birth planning commission, central- and provincial-level birth planning officials, the state's scientific advisors, community implementors, and the program's individual targets (now "clients"). Both authors had the extraordinary opportunity to carry a draft of this book to Beijing in late 2003 and to query key participants in our story on questions of fact and interpretation. These contacts have also placed in the authors' hands unusually complete documentation on the origins and development of China's birth project within the leading bodies of the regime itself. Drawing on this variety of personal experiences and written materials, only a fraction of which we can cite, we have attempted to convey the perspectives and voices of the Chinese who have been engaged in this giant project of social engineering in different ways—as policymakers and implementors, propagandists and critics, compliers and resisters.

Part 1, on policy formulation and implementation, takes the perspective of actors within the state. Written by Winckler, a political scientist, these chapters are based on his close reading and analysis of the state's own record of what it has done, as reflected in speeches, policy documents, and official reports selected for their importance by the birth program itself. Winckler's analysis of these materials is informed by a decade of research on the program, including field trips to China in 1993 and 2003 that involved visits to field sites in Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Shaanxi (in 1993) and Heilongjiang and Qinghai (in 2003). His analysis also draws on extensive interviews with top Chinese birth planning officials who visited the United States between 1998 and 2002, updated by interviews in China in late 2003. These officials, who occupy key positions in national and provincial birth planning organizations, are the very people now formulating and implementing the reforms

reported here, the people to whom PRC leaders have entrusted the future of the program.

Part 2, on the social and political consequences of the birth project, views developments in good part from the vantage point of cadres and ordinary people at the level of the rural village and urban enterprise trying to cope with the ambitious project the state has assigned them. Written by Greenhalgh, an anthropologist, the chapters in Part 2 are based on a broad review and synthesis of anthropological and other literatures on contemporary China, press accounts of China's population affairs, and, most important, her own research in and on China over twenty years. That research included two periods of ethnographic fieldwork in three Shaanxi villages (1988 and 1993) and extensive interviews with national-level population policymakers and their scientific advisors (especially in 1986, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1999, and 2003). The fieldwork also involved visits to sites in Guangdong and Hebei (in 1985), as well as Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Shaanxi (in 1993). Since the mid-1980s, Greenhalgh has also been actively engaged with some of China's population specialists, especially those concerned about the social costs of the one-child policy.

PRC birth program officials have displayed an admirable commitment to leaving as complete a record of program history as possible, particularly recently, by declassifying as many historical materials as is politically possible. The authors have been impressed by the willingness—even eagerness—of most program officials to assist foreign scholars in compiling a record that outsiders can regard as complete and accurate. The program sources we use are not only the program's own record of *how* it has been run but also the documents *from which* it has been run. They are not, by and large, materials concocted mainly for domestic or international political consumption. There has been no “second set of books” available for coordinating the program's hundreds of thousands of operatives—though, of course, the written record has always been supplemented in practice by superiors' oral instructions and subordinates' interpretations of what leaders wanted.

Despite the considerable candor shown by our hosts and their histories, we maintain a reflexive attitude toward our texts, keeping in mind how they have been constructed, for what ends, and with what effects. As many students of Chinese politics have noted, wordsmithing is a fundamental technique of PRC statecraft (e.g., Schoenhals 1992). It has been crucial in the population domain. The 1,500-page *Encyclopedia of Birth Planning*, the program's main compilation of documents and our single most important source on policy-making, illustrates the range of purposes for which such compendia have been assembled. This 1997 compilation appears to have had several purposes, with

contradictory consequences for reliability. Arguably the most general purpose was to document regime authorizations for the existence and autonomy of the program, which have periodically come under threat from government downsizings and mergers of ministries. For this purpose the *Encyclopedia*, like other program compendia, scours leaders' speeches and official documents for any remarks relevant to the program, often tearing those remarks out of their original contexts and inflating their importance, particularly for the Mao era. Undoubtedly another purpose was to demonstrate to national political leaders that the program had paid meticulous attention to their instructions and had done a good job of following them, with good results. That intention is reflected in the exasperating (but telling) arrangement of the materials in the *Encyclopedia* according to the order of official precedence of PRC leaders and institutions. Certainly a third purpose was to provide a complete, detailed, and accurate record of the instructions and regulations governing the program, as an important part of improving its efficiency and efficacy through institutionalization.

We use contemporary materials, such as the *Encyclopedia*, to understand the past with full awareness of the methodological problems involved. In China, as elsewhere, history has been constantly rewritten in response to changing circumstances. Having ourselves lived through the historical transformations from the tough-talking Deng era to the soft-speaking Hu era, we are keenly aware of how Chinese stories about Chinese population policy have changed with the times. Our experience with these materials suggests that who writes the history makes a big difference. Program histories crafted by hardliners and softliners emphasize different past events and reach different conclusions about issues such as the necessity of retaining versus abandoning the one-child policy. Recent softer accounts foreground earlier attempts at reform that hardliners had frustrated and that earlier harder accounts had downplayed. To get outside these stories, we read *across* texts, comparing the different facts marshalled and interpretations offered by different authors. We also read *against* our texts, trying to understand what part of the historical record is being suppressed for what purpose.

This reflexive approach to our materials extends to the journalistic items used in Part 2. Clearly the stories Western journalists have told about China's population policy have been crafted to fit larger Western narratives about China. Similarly, the individual cases they have presented as emblematic were selected to fit those stories (cf. Madsen 1995; Weston and Jensen eds. 2000). Thus, in the mid-1980s, the dominant news story in the West was of a coercive totalitarian regime, the cases of journalistic interest those of individuals suffering from the brutal enforcement of the one-child policy. In the late

1990s and early 2000s, the story has been of a modernizing, increasingly capitalist China, the cases of interest “quality” single children with consumerist tastes and global aspirations. In Part 2, we mine the Western news items for both types of cases—suffering villagers and spoiled city singletons—in full awareness of the changing narrative context that drew journalists’ attention to them at different times.

Faced with length limits, we have tried to economize on the length of citations while still meeting the needs of both specialists and general readers. In order to provide a fresh view, Part 1 was written directly from primary sources. In-text citations to chronologies take the form “(ME 570227),” providing the reader with the exact date of occurrence and referring to the entry under that date in one or another of several main chronologies. Whenever possible the reference is to the most up-to-date and readily available chronology (*Main Events*, abbreviated ME, in the references as Yang, Liang, and Zhang 2001). Citations to documents also concentrate on the few most complete collections, taking the in-text form “(EBP, 22–23).” Whenever possible the reference is to the program’s most recent, most authoritative, and most widely available 1997 compilation, *Encyclopedia of Birth Planning* (abbreviated as EBP). Space constraints have dictated not providing long Chinese titles and their English translations. Instead, we have specified each document’s nature in the text, enabling specialists to consult the source cited. In both parts, authors’ interviews are cited in the form “(SG 25Deco3 BJ),” with the last two letters indicating the place where the interview was held (BJ for Beijing). Most interviewees are left anonymous because of the sensitivity of our subject and the potential dangers some informants might face were their identities made known. However, in some cases we do identify informants: where clearly they would be happy to be identified, where they would run no risks as a result, and where the source was particularly authoritative. In those cases the informant’s initials are added after the place of interview and the initials are explained in the table of abbreviations at the end of the book. In citations to chronologies and interviews, omission of the day or month in the date reflects the lack of temporal specificity of the event or source.

In Part 1, on birth planning itself, citations to secondary sources do not so much specify sources of information as indicate the main previous contributions, so that general readers can find more on the topic in English. However, the secondary literature does provide the basis for the summaries of political context, albeit reformulated into the policy tendencies framework employed in this book. Part 2 follows standard citation practices.

A Look Ahead

This introductory chapter has stated some main themes, enough to enable readers to proceed directly to the body of the book if they wish. Chapter 2, the *Problematique*, provides a fuller statement of the concepts used in this book, a statement to which some readers may wish to return only as they feel the need to do so. The body of the book consists of two main parts connected by a bridge chapter. A Conclusion returns to the main themes and briefly outlines the implications of our research for U.S. policy.

Chapter 2, the *Problematique*, lays out key concepts that are crucial to understanding the analysis that follows. A first section elaborates on our central analytic theme, governmentalization, and the two perspectives (regime capacity and biopower) through which we approach it. A second section elaborates three variants of the broad Chinese–Leninist project of which PRC birth policy is a part, explicating Maoism as Revolutionary Mobilization, Stalinism as Bureaucratic Professionalism, and Reformism as Socialist Marketization. Analysis of the changing mix of Leninist approaches will be central to our discussion of population policy in Part I. These approaches provide the larger political context within which birth policy evolved, as well as the specific mechanisms or instruments for use in birth policy implementation—most broadly, mobilization, bureaucracy, and markets. A third section stipulates three dimensions of population that structure PRC population policy: location, quantity, and quality. Each of these is important in itself, but together the three dimensions define distinctive population policy regimes.

Part I on policy represents a view “from the top” of the regime’s governing apparatus. It traces PRC policies toward reproduction and population since the founding of the regime in 1949, embedding the many shifts in China’s population policies into the changing political and social imperatives of the PRC regime. The part’s introduction notes the actors involved in the policy process, and outlines the guiding and operational components of Chinese birth policy. The terms introduced here inform the analysis throughout the book; so we urge readers to peruse the introduction to Part I before turning to the individual chapters. Chapter 3 traces the erratic ascent of advocacy of “soft” birth control during the Mao era from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. Chapter 4 takes a fresh look at the best-known period of China’s birth planning history, the Deng era of “hard” birth limitation from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. As PRC leaders aggressively pursued their goal of modernizing China by century’s end, the PRC became infamous for its heavy-handed enforcement of the one-child policy. That effort went through successive phases of advance, consolidation, and re-enforcement. Chapter 5 documents the successively deepening reforms of hard birth plan-

ning launched during the Jiang era from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s. In an era of sweeping social and economic change, the PRC has done its best to gain popular support for birth planning, effecting reforms that have been increasingly far-reaching yet are still little known outside China. This effort produced first state-centric administrative rationalization, then some movement toward client-oriented deregulation and, finally, Comprehensive Reform.

Chapter 6 serves as a bridge between Part 1 and Part 2. It describes Comprehensive Reform, the general framework for many specific changes in the program to be made in the first decade of the twenty-first century and beyond. More analytically, this chapter uses Comprehensive Reform to illustrate an epochal shift that the whole PRC regime is attempting, toward some form of neoliberalism. Finally, as it sketches the several levels within Comprehensive Reform, this “pivot” chapter carries the reader down from the national level of Part 1 to the community level of Part 2.

Part 2 maps the view “from the bottom” of the state apparatus to report social reactions and effects, then switches to a view “from outside” to make more comprehensive assessments. This part focuses on the post-Mao era, when the governmentalization of population proceeded apace. The introduction to this part maps out its analytic terrain and highlights three cultural logics—culture as lived practice, as discourse, and as (bio) ethics—that, together with scientific and market logics, help make sense of the surprisingly broad effects of China’s population policy. Chapter 7 analyzes the politics of enforcement at the community level in urban and rural settings. It documents a transformation from Leninist to more neoliberal biopolitics that has involved shifts from quantity to quality, from state regulation to self-regulation, and from concentration of power in the state to its dispersal to other actors. Chapter 8 explains how the birth program inadvertently produced vast social suffering and some little known positive effects. In the process, it restructured Chinese society along reproductive lines, reinforcing old inequalities between urban and rural, male and female, while introducing new inequalities based on categories in the birth program itself. Chapter 9 explores the effects of post-Mao population policy on Chinese politics writ large: strengthening the socialist party-state, remaking state-society relations, and reestablishing China’s global position in complex and contradictory ways. Overall, analytically, this part explores how in the reform era the rapid development of population science and scientism—the exaggerated belief in the efficacy of science—worked to redefine the state’s population project and reorganize relations between state and society, producing effects never imagined by China’s policymakers.

Chapter 10, the Conclusion, uses our application of the governmentaliza-

tion perspective to Chinese population politics to explore some wider questions about Leninism and modernity. One is whether Leninism in China has been a success or a failure. During the twentieth century the Leninist project undertaken throughout the communist world was meant to revolutionize society in a broadly socialist direction under the strong leadership of a Leninist party guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology. In China, post-Mao reforms have peeled away Maoist and Stalinist layers, revealing the PRC's persisting "late Leninism," which now must come to terms with global neoliberalism. When communism fell in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, influential Western analysts pronounced Leninism a "grand failure" and a great tragedy (Brzezinski 1989; Malia 1994). PRC leaders' decision to engineer a gradual transition from communism suggests that it was largely a failure in China as well. This book's close study of birth planning—a large-scale Leninist project launched in the midst of reforms dismantling Leninism—provides insight into these big questions and large processes.

A second broad question concerns the nature of Chinese modernity. When China's leaders launched marketizing reforms in the late 1970s, they sought to restore China's historic greatness by rapidly transforming a poor backward society into a modern nation and global power based on the principles of science and democracy. Motivated by these same goals, the post-Mao birth planning project invites us to ask what kind of modernity China's leaders have made and whether—or rather, how—the promises of "science" and "democracy" have been fulfilled. Finally, the critical literature on modern power suggests that in Western Europe the modern political era brought the emergence of biopower—the increasing power over and ordering of the production and cultivation of life itself—as a central domain of modern power, a domain that increasingly eluded the grasp of the state. The study of post-1949 Chinese population politics provides an opportunity for us to trace the evolution of this power over life in a very different setting, asking how Chinese biopower developed, what it produced, and how the particular configuration of state, disciplinary, and market power that emerged in China differed from the configurations of power seen in the West.

A Statistical Overview

There are many studies of China's demography, but clearly this book is not one of them. As students of population politics, we are keenly interested in the numbers, but not for what they reveal about population dynamics. Instead, we mine the numbers for insights into the underlying politics of population policy, as well as for evidence of the policies' intended and unintended effects. Accordingly, tables are used sparingly. There is one table

that deserves special note, however. Table 1 provides an overview of trends in population size, growth, and fertility over the first 53 years of the PRC. In reading the chapters, especially those on the history of population policy, the reader may wish to consult this table occasionally for grounding in the demographic dynamics of different eras.

TABLE I
Basic Demographic Data for the PRC, 1949–2001
 (Total Year-end Population, Crude Birth Rate, Crude Death Rate, Natural Increase Rate, and Total Fertility Rate)

Year	Total population (in millions)	CBR	CDR	NIR	TFR
1949	541.67	36.00	20.00	16.00	6.14
1950	551.96	37.00	18.00	19.00	5.81
1951	563.00	37.80	17.80	20.00	5.70
1952	574.82	37.00	17.00	20.00	6.47
1953	587.96	37.00	14.00	23.00	6.05
1954	602.66	37.97	13.18	24.79	6.28
1955	614.56	32.60	12.28	20.32	6.26
1956	628.28	31.90	11.40	20.50	5.85
1957	645.63	34.03	10.80	23.23	6.41
1958	659.94	29.22	11.98	17.24	5.68
1959	672.07	24.78	14.59	10.19	4.30
1960	662.07	20.86	25.43	-4.57	4.02
1961	658.59	18.02	14.24	3.78	3.29
1962	672.95	37.01	10.02	26.99	6.02
1963	691.72	43.37	10.04	33.33	7.50
1964	704.99	39.14	11.50	27.64	6.18
1965	725.38	37.88	9.50	28.38	6.08
1966	745.42	35.05	8.83	26.22	6.26
1967	763.68	33.96	8.43	25.53	5.31
1968	785.34	35.59	8.21	27.38	6.45
1969	806.71	34.11	8.03	26.08	5.72
1970	829.92	33.43	7.60	25.83	5.81
1971	852.29	30.65	7.32	23.33	5.44
1972	871.77	29.77	7.61	22.16	4.98
1973	892.11	27.93	7.04	20.89	4.54
1974	908.59	24.82	7.34	17.48	4.17
1975	924.20	23.01	7.32	15.69	3.57
1976	937.17	19.91	7.25	12.66	3.24
1977	949.74	18.93	6.87	12.06	2.84
1978	962.59	18.25	6.25	12.00	2.72
1979	975.42	17.82	6.21	11.61	2.75

TABLE I
(Continued)

Year	Total population (in millions)	CBR	CDR	NIR	TFR
1980	987.05	18.21	6.34	11.87	2.24
1981	1000.72	20.91	6.36	14.55	2.63
1982	1016.54	22.28	6.60	15.68	2.87
1983	1030.08	20.19	6.90	13.29	2.42
1984	1043.57	19.90	6.82	13.08	2.35
1985	1058.51	21.04	6.78	14.26	2.20
1986	1075.07	22.43	6.86	15.57	2.42
1987	1093.00	23.33	6.72	16.61	2.59
1988	1110.26	22.37	6.64	15.73	2.31
1989	1127.04	21.58	6.54	15.04	2.25
1990	1143.33	21.06	6.67	14.39	2.17
1991	1158.23	19.68	6.70	12.98	2.01
1992	1171.71	18.24	6.64	11.60	1.83*
1993	1185.17	18.09	6.64	11.45	1.78*
1994	1198.50	17.70	6.49	11.21	1.73*
1995	1211.21	17.12	6.57	10.55	1.68*
1996	1223.89	16.98	6.56	10.42	1.65*
1997	1236.26	16.57	6.51	10.06	1.59*
1998	1247.61	15.64	6.50	9.14	1.59*
1999	1257.86	14.64	6.46	8.18	1.58*
2000	1267.43	14.03	6.45	7.58	1.55*
2001	1276.27	13.38	6.43	6.95	—

SOURCE: *China Statistical Yearbook 2002*.

NOTE: Because of the large increase in the underreporting of births from the late 1980s and, even more so, the early 1990s, estimates of the total fertility rate for 1991–2000 vary widely. The unadjusted TFR from the annual State Statistical Bureau surveys fell from 1.82 in 1991 to 1.46 in 1995 to 1.22 in 2000. Since an annual average of 27 percent of births were underreported in the 1990s, those figures need to be adjusted upward rather substantially. A careful review of all the large-scale data on births and underreporting in the 1990s suggests that the TFR is likely to be on the order of 1.5–1.6 (Zhang Guangyu 2004; also Retherford et al. 2005). Because of these data difficulties, the State Birth Planning Commission does not publish TFRs. In planning documents and public statements it uses the conservative figure of 1.8.

*Based on time-series reconstructed by Zhang Guangyu 2004.